The Space of Reasons Committing Philosophical Homicide, One Argument at a Time! Statistics Unique Visitors: Total Unique Visitors: Outgoing: Total Outgoing: 1 0 7 3901

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Back in Scotland 2007-07-19 10:15:00 I’m finally back in Scotland, after my all too brief Caribbean adventure, and will be submitting my M.Phil dissertation in less than a month. Very exciting times. This is also a sad time since I will soon be saying goodbye to St Andrews. I begin my PhD at Columbia University in September, which I am eagerly looking forward to. And while we’re on the topic of grad school, there is a great discussion over at Philosophy, et cetera on Getting the Most out of Grad School. The post is actually from last month, but it is definitely worth reading (especially for those who will be beginning their graduate studies this Fall). ...

Naturalised Epistemology: Quine vs. Stroud (Part 1) 2007-07-13 09:33:00 The central difference between Quinean naturalised epistemology and traditional epistemology is located in Quine's rejection of first philosophy. Traditional epistemology is involved in the following two-fold task. First, traditional epistemology seeks to identify the regulating criterion for knowledge. Second, it tries to determine, based on this criterion, whether or not we truly have knowledge. This two-fold task is referred to as first philosophy because it is analytically prior to all of our sensory or empirical knowledge. In brief, traditional epistemology attempts to find the epistemic foundation and justification for all scientific knowledge.Quine believes that traditional epistemology's attempt to find a justification for knowledge outside of or prior to science has either failed or is moribund. Our only remaining hope of finding a validation for science is within science itself. Hence, Quine's now famous (or is that infamous?) declaration: "Epistemology, or something like ...

St Thomas or Bust 2007-07-03 02:47:00 I’m heading off to St Thomas to recharge my Caribbean batteries. A son of the sun like myself can spend only so much time in grey Scotland without going completely insane. Since I probably won’t have internet access for the duration of my trip my blog will be going on a brief hiatus. However, I will be back in about two weeks time.Sam, from over at Philosophy Hurts Your Head, has paid me the compliment of including the Space of Reasons on his top 5 open-minded bloggers list. I feel honoured! I will be posting my list of 5 when I get back.Until then… ...

The Conditional Probability Solution to the Swamping Problem (Carter) 2007-06-25 11:13:00 Note: The following is a cross-post written by J. Adam Carter, from over at Virtue Epistemology.Goldman and Olsson (forthcoming) in “Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge” offer several insightful responses to the ‘swamping problem.’ I think that the ‘conditional probability’ solution that they offer is the most interesting; evaluating this solution requires attention to some important, and sometimes unnoticed, aspects of the problem.The swamping problem has been articulated a variety of ways, and unfortunately, different versions of the problem have been referred to under the same label.Here’s a general and (hopefully) uncontroversial formulation of the problem, as presented by Goldman and Olsson:Template Swamping Argument(S1) Knowledge equals reliably produced true belief (simple reliabilism)(S2) If a given belief is true, its value will not be raised by the fact that it was reliably produced.(S3) Hence: knowledge is no more valuable than unreliably produced true beli ...

St Andrews 2007 Graduation Pictures 2007-06-22 04:40:00 are here. ...

Defending the Lottery Argument (Part 2) 2007-06-18 03:56:00 In this post, I will address Aidan's second objection to my lottery argument. By his lights, even if we grant whatever closure (or conjunction) step I need to make the aforementioned inference, premise (A6) still seems in need of defence. For example, suppose that S, due to some introspective failure, does not recognise that what she may justifiably believe about this lottery has the form of (a*). This is consistent with S's recognizing that if she believed something which had the form (a*) she would be believing a set of inconsistent propositions.The upshot, according to Aidan, is that (A3) and (A4) might be true, and my opponent might grant me whatever I need to conclude from that that what S may justifiably believe about this lottery is (by (A5)) inconsistent. But even in the presence of (A6) that's not enough for (A7); it's not enough that S recognize that something of the form (a*) would be inconsistent – she must also recognise that what she may justifiably believe about t ...

Defending the Lottery Argument (Part 1) 2007-06-11 03:43:00 Over the weekend I finally had the honour of meeting Aidan McGlynn, of The Boundaries of Language fame, who was one of the delegates at the Arché Vagueness Conference here at St Andrews. Aaron Bogart, from over at Struggling to Philosophize, was also at St Andrews over the weekend and promises to visit again later this summer. Looking forward to sharing a pint and a chin-wag with you again, Aaron.Now, down to business. In honour of Aidan’s very thoughtful comments, I’ve decided to dedicate this (and the upcoming) post to responding to his two objections to my lottery argument. Aidan's first objection is that my argument presupposes some type of closure principle. While he does not actually spell out any particular closure principle, given that my argument has to do with justification, he presumably has something akin to the following justification closure principle in mind:(JCP) If S may justifiably believe p and p entails q, and S competently deduces q from p and accepts ...

Richard Rorty, 1931-2007 2007-06-09 13:15:00 The following obit is taken from today's issue of Telos: Richard Rorty, the leading American philosopher and heir to the pragmatist tradition, passed away on Friday, June 8. He was Professor of Comparative Literature emeritus at Stanford University. In April the American Philosophical Society awarded him the Thomas Jefferson Medal. The prize citation reads: "In recognition of his influential and distinctively American contribution to philosophy and, more widely, to humanistic studies. His work redefined knowledge 'as a matter of conversation and of social practice, rather than as an attempt to mirror nature' and thus redefined philosophy itself as an unending, democratically disciplined, social and cultural activity of inquiry, reflection, and exchange, rather than an activity governed and validated by the concept of objective, extramental truth." At the awards ceremony, presenter Lionel Gossman celebrated Dr. Rorty as an advocate of "a deeply liberal, democratic, and truly ...

The 48th Philosophers' Carnival 2007-06-06 09:05:00 is here! ...

Lottery Argument Against Defeasible Evidence 2007-06-04 03:01:00 This post is an updated version of one I published over at the Web of Belief.I wish to argue that it is a conceptual requirement of justification that it be factive. On this view, it is a conceptual requirement vis-à-vis some type or token reason {R}, that {R} may only justify a subject’s belief that p if {R} guarantees the truth of p. When {R} meets this stipulation, I will describe {R} as a factive reason for believing that p. I contrast having a factive reason for p with having evidence for p, in which evidence is essentially defeasible. Typically, when we describe some evidence {E} as defeasible, we mean that {E} may be evidence for p despite the fact that {E} ? {E*} is not evidence for p. In such a case, we would say that {E*} defeats {E}, or that {E*} is a defeater for {E}. In the discussion that follows, I will be using the expression ‘defeasible’ more broadly to refer to any evidence {E} for p, in which {E} fails to guarantee the truth of p. I take defeasible e ...

The Philosopher vs. the Biblical Fundamentalist (Round Two) 2007-05-27 04:28:00 John F. Hobbins, from over at Ancient Hebrew Poetry, has written a response to my post, The Philosopher vs. the Biblical Fundamentalist. In my initial response to Hobbins I claimed that although (or perhaps because) he is a Methodist minister, his position is not a Biblical Fundamentalist one. I believe the reasons for my original assertion will become clear by the end of this post. More significantly, I will argue that even taken on its own terms, Hobbins' position has troubling implications, not only for Biblical Fundamentalism, but for any authoritative view of Christian scripture.Before delving into my reply to Hobbins, I want to quickly address Matt Nehls' reply to my anti-Fundamentalist argument. Both Hobbins and Nehls agree that the locution, “the Son of Man coming in the clouds”, actually refers to Israel’s apocalyptic victory over its enemies. Nehls posits that this interpretation hinges on the following claims:First, this passage is Matthew's redactional work o ...

Challenging the Swamping Premise (Carter) 2007-05-23 04:38:00 Note: The following is a cross-post written by J. Adam Carter, from over at Virtue Epistemology. Adam has an on-going treatment of the swamping problem, so if that's your thing, be sure to check it out.The ‘swamping’ argument against reliabilism has been advanced on several occasions (i.e. Kvanvig 2003, Swinburne 1999, Zagzebski 2004, W. Jones 1997, and others), and is, at least prima facie, quite persuasive.The crucial premise in the argument is, as Kristoffer Ahlstrom (whose formalization I am using) calls it, the swamping premise.(1) V (SB R,T that p) = V (SBT that p).The swamping premise has been defended a variety of ways. Zagzebski (2004), for example, defends (1) with her ‘espresso analogy.’ She argues that good espresso from an unreliable espresso machine is just as valuable as good espresso from a reliable espresso machine. Analogously, she thinks, for beliefs. Being produced from a reliable process doesn’t add value to a true belief. And, thus, (1).Kvanvig (2003) ...

Technorati Test 2007-05-13 10:54:00 Technorati Profile ...

Strongly Believe vs. Weakly Believe 2007-05-12 13:52:00 Note: This post was originally composed as a reply to Rachael's insightful comments in response to my post, “Probable But Unjustifiable”, over at the Web of Belief. The proposal I canvas is still rough and needs further ironing out. Any feedback is greatly appreciated. Occasionally, we use “I believe” to identify something we are certain about. For example, I believe that I am now thinking. Sometimes we use ‘I believe’ to describe something we are intellectually/ rationally/ doxastically committed to. For example, I believe that 1 + 1 = 2. Often we use ‘I believe’ to identify something we take ourselves to know. I believe I'm currently looking at a computer monitor. This is also something that I know! However, we frequently use ‘I believe’ to indicate something we merely hold to be likely. Consider the following exchange:A: “Is it 2:30pm yet?”B: “I'm not sure, but I believe it is.”B seems like a perfectly natural thing to say (though on at lea ...

The Philosopher vs. the Biblical Fundamentalist 2007-05-07 07:04:00 I realise that this post is a radical departure from the usual content of this blog, but I thought it would be fun to mix things up a little. Here, I will be presenting an argument against certain types of Biblical Fundamentalism—namely, those which hold to a literal interpretation of the Bible. The argument presented here was originally featured on one of my weblogs as a parody. But after receiving several email correspondences from Biblical Fundamentalists attempting to refute my argument (quite unsuccessfully in my opinion), I am beginning to suspect that I may actually be on to something. My argument, simply stated, is that if Biblical literalism is true (a claim many Biblical Fundamentalist subscribe to) then Biblical Fundamentalism must be false.Let us define Biblical literalism as the claim that the Bible should be interpreted at face value, unless otherwise clearly indicated. On this view, the creation of the world by God, the parting of the red sea by Moses, the resurrec ...